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Race, Federalism, and Voting Rights
Guy- Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwert

INTRODUCTION

In Shelby County v. Holder,' the Supreme Court struck
down Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA") on the grounds
that the Act violated "basic principles" of federalism and the
equal sovereignty of the states. 2 Though the debate over "our
federalism" is a longstanding one, federalism considerations in
the context of voting rights are of more recent vintage. Indeed,
notwithstanding the fact that Congress enacted the VRA nearly
fifty years ago, it was not until thirty years later, in Miller v.
Johnson,3 that a majority of Justices first alluded to the
"federalism costs" of the VRA. 4 By 1997, in Reno v. Bossier
ParishSchool Board,5 these costs had become "serious." And in

Charles S. Rhyne Professor of Law, Senior Associate Dean for Faculty & Research
at Duke Law School; Professor of Law and Harry T. Ice Faculty Fellow at Indiana
University Maurer School of Law. We would like to thank Michael Kent Curtis and
Heather Gerken for their helpful comments and generous feedback, as well as
participants at The University of Chicago Legal Forum 2014 symposium, "Does Election
Law Serve the Electorate?" We must also thank the law faculties at the William S. Boyd
School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas and Wake Forest Law School, where we
presented earlier drafts of this project.
1 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
Id. at 2624, 2631. Section 4(b) of the VRA established a mechanism or formula for
2
identifying the parts of the country that Congress believed engaged in the most amount
of racial discrimination in voting. Pursuant to Section 4, if a jurisdiction administered a
test or device for voting in 1964 and less than 50 percent of that jurisdiction's citizens
were registered to vote or voted, that jurisdiction was "covered" by Section 4(b). 43
U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2002). If a jurisdiction is "covered" by Section 4(b), Section 5 of the VRA
requires that jurisdiction to submit its laws related to voting-"voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure"-to the Attorney General of
the United States or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia before
those laws can go into effect. 43 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2000).
515 U.S. 900 (1995).
Id. at 926-27 ("But our belief in Katzenbach that the federalism costs exacted by
§ 5 preclearance could be justified by those extraordinary circumstances does not mean
they can be justified in the circumstances of this litigation.").
s 520 U.S. 471 (1997).

113

114

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL

FORUM

[ 2015

1999, in Lopez v. Monterey County,7 they had become
"substantial." After the Court decided Northwest Austin v.
Holder,9 in 2009, it was clear that the Court's worry about
federalism costs would weigh significantly in the Court's
assessment of the constitutionality of the Act. Northwest Austin
echoed the Court's previous assertions that the Act imposed
substantial federalism costs and implicitly warned that at some
point those costs would become insurmountable. 10 Scarcely four
years later, in Shelby County, the Court finally concluded that
the Act's federalism costs outweighed its benefits. The Court
held that the Act's coverage provision, Section 4, was
unconstitutional, which consequently froze the parasitic
preclearance provision, Section 5.11 As a result, Northwest
Austin and Shelby County have thrust federalism into the heart
of voting rights disputes. 12
The interjection of federalism concerns into the voting
rights context raises a number of issues, three of which we
examine in this Essay. First, while the Court has clearly
expressed its concerns that the VRA raises constitutional
questions because of its federalism costs, the Court has said very
little about the content of its concerns. What exactly are these
federalism costs and why have they undermined the
constitutionality of the VRA? As we show in Part I, the justices
who are concerned about the federalism costs of the VRA have
been very vague about the object of their concerns and they have
failed to provide guidance on how to balance these costs against
the purported benefits of the VRA. Building on our previous
work, 13 we argue that the term "federalism costs" is but a truism

6 Id. at 480 (1997) ("To require a jurisdiction to litigate
whether its proposed
redistricting plan also has a dilutive 'result' before it can implement that plan--even if
the Attorney General bears the burden of proving that 'result'-is to increase further the
serious federalism costs already implicated by § 5.").
525 U.S. 266 (1999).
8 Id. at 282 ("We have recognized that the Act, which authorizes federal intrusion
into sensitive areas of state and local policymaking, imposes substantial 'federalism
costs."').
9 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
10 See id. at 202.
11 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
12 See generally Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a
Constraint on the Voting Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195 (2012) (advocating for the
abandonment of federalism as the defining norm in the voting rights context).
13 Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, State's
Rights, Last Rites, and
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signaling that the Voting Rights Act raises serious
constitutional questions. In other words, the term is a reflection
of the Court's intuitive discomfort with the exercise of federal
power in a particular context or with the substantive aim of
federal power in a particular context. When the Court raises the
federalism costs argument, it is not clear whether it means to
say anything other than simply "there is something about this
that makes us deeply uncomfortable."
Second, should the Reconstruction Amendments play any
role in determining the allocation of power between the federal
government and the states in the context of race and voting? Or
put a different way, Part II asks whether the Court in Shelby
County should have considered whether Reconstruction tipped
the scales on the question of our federalism. At the risk of
stating the obvious, we did have a civil war, soon followed by
what is known as Congressional Reconstruction. This is the time
in our history that brought us myriad constitutional
amendments and congressional legislation designed to alleviate
the plight of the newly freed Black population.1 4 How should we
understand this important time in our constitutional history? In
specific reference to the right to vote, how should we understand
the Fifteenth Amendment, and particularly its Section 2, which
confers on Congress the power to enforce the Amendment "by
appropriate legislation"? Or put more generally, did
Reconstruction change anything? In Shelby County, Chief
Justice Roberts supported his federalism argument by citing to
the Tenth Amendment.15 But relying on the Tenth Amendment
is too facile; the argument assumes uncritically that the
Reconstruction Amendments did not alter the federalism
calculus. 16 Maybe at the end of the day, that argument is right
and Reconstruction did not alter the original allocation of power

Voting Rights, 47 CONN. L. REV. 481, 514-24 (2014).
14
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIII-XV ("Reconstruction Amendments"); Civil
Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat 27; Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 152, 14 Stat. 428;
Anti-Peonage Act of 1867, ch. 188, 14. Stat. 546; Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 116, 16
Stat. 140; Enforcement (Ku Klux Klan) Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (precursor to
§ 1983); and, inter alia, Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
15

133 S. Ct. at 2623.

See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 207 n. 3 (White, J., dissenting) ("I
do not -read the majority's many invocations of history to be anything other than
elaborate window dressing .... One would not know from reading the majority's
account, for instance, that the nature of federal-state relations changed fundamentally
after the Civil War.").
16
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between the national government and the states. But the
question is worth asking, particularly in this context. The Court
never engages in the inquiry and its refusal to ask is the sum of
our complaint.
Third, we introduce in Part III a different variable for
consideration in the federalism debate. This Part asks whether
the federalism project ought to demonstrate the capacity to
protect the rights of racial minorities before we assent to its
demands. Consider in this vein the account of federalism that
lies at the heart of the modern debate over voting rights, one
that we adopt for this Article. This account of federalism argues
that competition between the states and the national
government as sovereign sites for decision-making protects
individual rights through the mechanism of self-rule.1 7 More
specifically, according to Larry Kramer, the federalism balance
forged at the founding "was also said to protect liberty, because
state governments are smaller and closer to the people, hence
more democratic and constitutive of popular self-government."18
This is an argument that reconciles federalism with democracy
or individual liberty.' 9 This understanding of federalism tips the
scales against national power and in favor of local control.
If this justification for federalism is sound, it raises two
related inquiries in the voting rights context. The first inquiry is
whether federalism in this context works for the protection of
America's quintessential minority, racial minorities. Squarely,

"

See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 92-94 (1995); Kathleen M.

Sullivan, From States' Rights Blues to Blue States' Rights: Federalism After the
Rehnquist Court, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 809 (2006) ("[It is immoral to cede selfgovernment to a distant bureaucrat in a remote capital rather than engaging in selfgovernment alongside nearby neighbors. This position implies a default rule in favor of
local power and requires very strong justifications for federal intervention.").
18 Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1498 (1994).
'o Consider the following description by Professor Blumstein:
Federalism provides a vehicle for allowing geographically
defined
constituencies, especially geographically defined minorities, to have a measure
of self-rule within the political framework of a broader nation-state.
Federalism responds to very real majoritarian tensions in pluralistic societies.
It serves as a tool for assuring limited self-government to a geographicallybased minority group. It is an accommodation to such a group whose political
interests might be persistently submerged if all political decisions were to be
made at the national level using the model of a unitary nation-state.
James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing
Paradigms, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1260 (1994); see also Michael W. McConnell,
Federalism:Evaluatingthe Founders'Design,54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1500-07 (1987).
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the question here is whether and to what extent federalism
safeguards the liberty interests of racial minorities by
facilitating their ability to engage in self-rule. Facilitating the
ability of racial minorities, specifically African Americans, to
engage in self-rule was arguably the aim of the Reconstruction
project. If "[fjederalism is a system that permits minorities to
rule," 2 0 we must ask, what about people of color? Does
federalism permit them to rule? The challenge for Chief Justice
Roberts in Shelby County is that if the federalism argument is to
be taken seriously, it must be the case that the states are more
likely than the federal government to provide a friendlier forum
for protecting the voting rights of racial minorities. The recent
history of North Carolina, 21 Indiana, 22 Wisconsin, 23 and Texas, 24
to name a few states, does not bode well for the federalism
argument. Not only is there scant evidence that the states are
interested in protecting the rights of voters of color, but the
early returns run in the opposite direction. 25 In order to justify
the extension of federalism in the racial discrimination context
and to render it consistent with an important consideration of
federalism as self-rule, the Court must encourage the states to
take up the role that federalism envisions for them, or else the
Court must recalibrate the federalism line in favor of the federal

Heather K. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (2009).
See Ari Berman, North Carolina Passes the Country's Worst Voter Suppression
Law, THE NATION (July 26, 2013, 9:51 AM), available at http://www.thenation.com/
blog/175441/north-carolina-passes-countrys-worst-voter-suppression-law,
archived at
http://perma.cc/N4NB-6RGA. For a history, see Michael Kent Curtis, Race as a Tool in
the Struggle for Political Mastery: North Carolina's "Redemption"Revisited 1870-1905
and 2011-2013, 33 LAW & INEQ. 53 (2015).
22 See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
23
See Ari Berman, Voter Suppression Backfires in Texas and Wisconsin, THE
NATION (Oct. 10, 2014, 9:50 AM), available at http://www.thenation.com/blog/181942/
voter-suppression-backfires-texas-and-wisconsin,
archived at http://perma.cc/DY4CD3AE.
24 See id.
20
21

2s This is in line with the conventional wisdom that federalism has been a "disaster"
for racial minorities. Ilya Somin, Taking Dissenting by Deciding All the Way Down, 48

TULSA L. REV. 523, 530 (2013); see WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION,

SIGNIFICANCE 152, 155 (1964) ("The main beneficiary [of federalism] throughout
American history has been the Southern Whites, who have been given the freedom to
oppress Negroes . . . . [I1f in the United States one approves of Southern white racists,
then one should approve of American federalism."). For a reevaluation of this
conventional wisdom, see Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, 24
DEMOCRACY J. 37, 37-38 (2012), available at http://www.democracyjournal.org/24/a-newprogressive-federalism.php?page=1, archived at http: //perma.cc /B54C-Q4MN; Somin,
supra, at 530-32.
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government once again. Or put a different way, the Court must
take seriously the tension between the Founding and the
Reconstruction Era.
The second inquiry is related to the first. It asks whether
the Court's version of decentralization will do a better job of
facilitating self-rule by racial minorities than Congress's version
of decentralization through the Voting Rights Act. Here is one
fact about the VRA that the Court in both Northwest Austin and
Shelby County failed to appreciate. To the extent that
decentralization, devolution, and subsidiarity are important
components of federalism, the VRA is model legislation. The
VRA facilitates the devolution of power from national majorities
to subnational majorities and from subnational majorities to
sub-state minorities. To be sure, in the context of the VRA, these
minorities happen to be racial minorities. But they are
minorities nonetheless, racial groups who are exercising
consequential political power, thanks to the VRA, at the state
and sub-state levels. This is an instance where nationalism
facilitates the values of federalism. Thus the question at the
heart of the larger debate: can the states do better? Can
federalism do better? If federalism cannot do better to facilitate
the political power of racial minorities at the sub-national level,
then federalism will not do. And if so, then there is no
compelling argument for enforcing federalism over nationalism
in the voting context.
I.

JUSTICE BLACK'S VINDICATION

The term "federalism costs" has become an empty slogan or,
at best, a truism in voting rights law, and particularly in
reference to the Voting Rights Act. The justices who worry about
the federalism costs of the VRA-for ease of exposition we will
term them the anti-nationalists-remind us often that the Act
imposes "federalism costs." At the heart of this critique stands
the figure of Justice Black, the sole dissenter in the canonical
South Carolina v. Katzenbach,26 which first considered the
constitutionality of the VRA. Justice Black complained that
Section 5 "approaches dangerously near to wiping the States out
as useful and effective units in the government of our country."2 7
26
27

383 U.S. 301 (1966).
Id. at 360 (Black, J., dissenting).
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Our task in this Part is to contextualize the Court's concern over
federalism costs in Northwest Austin and Shelby County.
A.

Origins

Consider first the origin of the concept. The Court first
mentioned these "federalism costs" in Miller v. Johnson.28 In
Miller, an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court
struck down Georgia's Congressional redistricting plan on the
ground that it was a racial gerrymander in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.2 9 Miller is notable as the first case to
give substance to the Court's Shaw doctrine. In Shaw v. Reno,30
the Court first concluded that race-conscious and bizarrelyshaped districts could be unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment on the ground that these districts communicated an
"expressive harm" 3 1 about the relationship between race and
political identity. 32 Miller replaced Shaw's eccentric and
amorphous "expressive harms inquiry," which focused on the
messages sent by the use of race in the creation of districting
plans, with a predominant factor inquiry, which focused on
whether race was the predominant factor in the redistricting
process.3 3 Under this new test, state actors may not use race for
its own sake as the "dominant and controlling rationale in
drawing its district lines." 34 When they do, the Court will apply

strict scrutiny.
In addressing whether Georgia had a compelling state
interest for using race, the Court argued that the State's "true
interest in designing" the district was "to satisfy the Justice
Department's preclearance demands." 35 The Court stated that
jurisdictions covered by Section 5 do not have a "compelling
interest in complying with whatever preclearance mandates the

28
29

515 U.S. 900, 926 (1995).
See id. at 928.

3o 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
s' See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, 'BizarreDistricts,"
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92
MICH. L. REV. 483, 506-07 (1993).
32 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657-58 (1993).
1 Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
4 Id. at 913.
3 Id. at 921.
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Justice Department issues." 36 Consequently, the Voting Rights
Act did not require the enacted plan. 37 The Court believed that
the Attorney General should not have refused to preclear the
first plan because there was no reason to believe that the plan
violated Section 5's non-retrogression standard. 38 From the
Court's perspective, the Department of Justice pursued a policy
of maximizing majority-minority districts and refused to
preclear Georgia's plan unless Georgia created more racial
districts. 39 To interpret the Act in this way, according to the
Miller Court, would raise "serious constitutional concerns." 40
The Court then went on to state:
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, we upheld § 5 as a
necessary and constitutional response to some States'
"extraordinary stratagems of contriving new rules of
various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting
discrimination in the face of adverse federal court
decrees." But our belief in Katzenbach that the
federalism costs exacted by § 5 preclearance could be
justified by those extraordinary circumstances does not
mean they can be justified in the circumstances of this
case. 41
As this discussion took place toward the very end of the
opinion, the Court did not further elaborate on what it meant by
federalism costs. Two years after Miller, in Reno v. Bossier
Parish,42 the Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, reversed
a lower court's decision that would have permitted the Justice
Department to decline to preclear a proposed redistricting plan
under Section 5 of the Act on the ground that the proposed plan
would dilute the voting rights of racial minorities in violation of

"

Id. at 922.
See Miller, 515 U.S. at 921.
3 See id. at 923. Long defined by Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), nonretrogression only requires that the voting change in question does not make voters of
color worse off (i.e., does not "retrogress") as compared to the status quo. Id. at 141.
3 See Miller, 515 U.S. at 924-25.
40 Id. at 926.
3

41

Id. at 926.

42

520 U.S. 471 (1997).
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Section 2 of the Act. 4 3 In explaining its decision, the Court
concluded that:
Section 5 already imposes upon a covered jurisdiction the
difficult burden of proving the absence of discriminatory
purpose and effect . . .. To require a jurisdiction to
litigate whether its proposed redistricting plan also has a
dilutive "result" before it can implement that plan-even
if the Attorney General bears the burden of proving that
"result"-is to increase further the serious federalism
costs already implicated by Section 5.44
Again, as in Miller, the majority did not expand further on
the now "serious" federalism costs of the VRA. Two years after
Bossier Parish, in Lopez v. Monterey County,4 5 the Court once

again referenced the federalism costs of the VRA while deciding
whether a covered county, Monterey County, in a non-covered
state, California, had to preclear voting changes compelled by
the non-covered state.4 6 A group of plaintiffs filed suit and
argued that the changes were subject to preclearance under
Section 5 because the county is a covered jurisdiction under
Section 4.47 California, which had intervened in the litigation,
argued that the VRA could not withstand constitutional scrutiny
if it "were interpreted to apply to voting measures enacted by
States that have not been designated as historical wrongdoers in
the voting rights sphere." 48 The Court acknowledged that it has
"recognized that the Act, which authorizes federal intrusion into
sensitive areas of state and local policymaking, imposes
substantial 'federalism costs."' 4 9 However, citing one of its then-

recent cases interpreting the scope of Congress's enforcement
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court rejected California's argument on the theory that
"legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations
can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if
in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself
a

Id. at 480.

*

Id. at 480.

46

525 U.S. 266 (1999).
Id. at 282.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 282.
Lopez, 525 U.S. at 282.

46

4
4
4
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unconstitutional and intrudes into legislative spheres of
autonomy previously reserved to the States."50
Consistent with its opinions in Miller and Bossier Parish,
the Court's discussion of federalism costs in Lopez is conclusory
and devoid of analysis. Moreover, the Court did not provide any
argument in support of its decision that the VRA could
withstand the "substantial" federalism costs in Lopez but not the
serious costs in Bossier Parish.As Professor Ellen Katz wrote in
the wake of Lopez and Bossier Parish, "[1]eft unexplained [in
Lopez] is why the Court understood the federalism costs
implicated in the Bossier Parish cases to be preclusively high,
while it viewed the costs at issue in Lopez to be the necessary
and justifiable result of implementing the VRA." 5 1
In retrospect, it should not have been surprising that in
both Northwest Austin and Shelby County the Court once again
referenced the "substantial federalism costs" of the Act. 5 2 This is
true even if few scholars and voting rights experts expected the
Court to strike down Section 4, and effectively suspend Section
5, by simply chanting federalism costs. What is surprising to us
is how much the Court left unsaid. That is, if the Court was
going to conclude that Section 4 of the VRA is unconstitutional
because of the federalism costs imposed by the Section 4-Section
5 tandem, it should have articulated those costs in explicit
terms.
B.

Context: Slow Progression Towards Anti-Nationalism

So what, then, are these federalism costs? The Court and
scholars alike have come to think of these "federalism costs" as
describing how the Act's special provisions-its coverage
provision, Section 4, and its preclearance provision, Section 5supposedly intrude upon state sovereignty. 53 There are a
5o Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 518 (1997)) (quotations
omitted).
5' Ellen D. Katz, Federalism, Preclearance,and the
Rehnquist Court, 46 VILL. L.
REV. 1179, 1180 (2001).
52
See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621 (2013) ("We
explained that § 5
'imposes substantial federalism costs' and 'differentiates between the States, despite our
historic tradition that all the States enjoy equal sovereignty.") (quoting N.W. Austin
Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder 557 U.S. 193, 202-03 (2009)); N.W. Austin, 557 U.S.
at 202 ("At the same time, § 5, 'which authorizes federal intrusion into sensitive areas of
state and local policymaking, imposes substantial "federalism costs.""').
53 See, e.g., Michael Halberstam, The Myth of "Conquered Provinces" Probing the
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number of objections to the VRA that the Court could be
summarizing by the phrase "federalism costs." Certainly, at the
highest level of generality, when the Court talks about the Act's
federalism costs it means to say that the legislation sweeps
broadly, that it unconstitutionally sets Congress as overseers of
the states, that it shifts the traditional burden of proof to the
submitting jurisdiction under preclearance review, and as Judge
Williams stated in his dissent from the D.C. Circuit's decision in
Shelby County, "[i]n the vast majority of cases,

. .

. the overall

effect of § 5 is merely to delay implementation of a perfectly
proper law." 5 4 In Northwest Austin, Chief Justice Roberts
framed the concern as follows:
"Section 5 goes beyond the prohibition of the Fifteenth
Amendment by suspending all changes to state election
been
have
they
innocuous-until
law-however
precleared by federal authorities in Washington, D.C.
The preclearance requirement applies broadly, and in
particular to every political subdivision in a covered
State, no matter how small."55

Federalism costs is a shorthand phrase for a diffuse set of
objections that essentially can be summarized by the conclusion
that the VRA is "strong medicine."56
One can get some purchase on the meaning of the phrase by
examining the various federalism-based objections that a
number of Justices have offered since the Court first heard a
constitutional challenge to the VRA. The worry that the VRA
imposes federalism costs is not new. Though a majority of the
Court did not express a concern with the federalism costs of the
VRA until Miller, a number of anti-nationalist justices have long
expressed their concern with the VRA in federalism terms. Chief
Justice Roberts could have been parroting Justice Black in
South Carolinav. Katzenbach, whom Chief Justice Roberts cited
in Northwest Austin.57 Justice Black objected to the VRA

Extent of the VRA's Encroachment on State and Local Autonomy, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 923
(2010) (discussing the cases and literature on the federalism costs of the VRA).
5
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Williams, J.,
dissenting).
557 U.S. at 202 (emphasis in original).
56
Shelby Chty., 133 S. Ct. at 2618.
57
See N.W. Austin, 557 U.S. at 202.
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because Section 5 "so distorts our constitutional structure of
government" by requiring state officials to "beg" the federal
government to approve state laws.5 8 Justice Black argued that

Section 5 was unconstitutional, as he believed that it gave the
federal government the ability to veto state laws.5 9 The Chief
Justice could have also looked to Justice Powell's dissent in
Georgia v. United States,60 which held that Georgia's state
legislative reapportionment plan was subject to preclearance
under the VRA, and which drew a Justice Black-like dissent
from Justice Powell. 61 Justice Powell exclaimed that it "is indeed
a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic structure of our
system, for federal authorities to compel a State to submit its
legislation for advance review." 62 Justice Powell saw the VRA as
an "unprecedented requirement of advance review of state or
local legislative acts by federal authorities." 6 3
Chief Justice Roberts also cited Justice Harlan's criticism of
the Court's broad construction of the statute in Allen v. State
Board of Elections.64 But Justice Harlan presented a slightly
different constitutional objection to the VRA. For Justice
Harlan, the problem with the VRA was not that the states could
not implement their law until approved by the federal
government. Rather, Justice Harlan objected to the proposition
that "Congress would single out a handful of States as requiring
stricter federal supervision concerning their treatment of a
problem that may well be just as serious in parts of the North as
it is in the South." 6 5 Racial discrimination in voting, Justice

Harlan believed, was "national in scope" and therefore deserved
a national, as opposed to a regional, response.6 6 Congress's

5 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 358 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting)
("Section 5, by providing that some of the States cannot pass state laws or adopt state
constitutional amendments without first being compelled to beg federal authorities to
approve their policies, so distorts our constitutional structure of government as to render
any distinction drawn in the Constitution between state and federal power almost
meaningless.").
5 See id. at 360.
6
411 U.S. 526 (1973).
6' Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 541 (1973).
62 Id. at 545 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original).

Id. at 545 & n. * (Powell, J., dissenting).
393 U.S. 544; N. W. Austin, 557 U.S. at 202.
6s Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 586 & n. 4 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6
See id. at 586. Justice Harlan was not alone in objecting to the selective
6

64
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failure to enact national legislation for a national
the
regional
coverage-preclearance
problem
rendered
structure unconstitutional.
Chief Justice Roberts could also have been attempting to
restate then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent from the Court's
opinion in City of Rome v. United States.6 7 In City of Rome, the
city of Rome argued that because it was a non-covered
jurisdiction and it had not engaged in racial discrimination in at
least seventeen years, it should not be required to preclear its
voting changes, notwithstanding the fact that the city was
within a covered jurisdiction, Georgia, which was required to
preclear its voting changes.68 The Court disagreed and held that
the preclearance requirement applied to a non-covered
jurisdiction in a covered state. 69 Additionally, even though the
city's voting changes may not have been enacted with a
discriminatory purpose, the Court concluded that the Attorney
General was right to object to the voting changes because the
changes had a discriminatory effect. 70
The Court's analysis drew a dissent from Justice Rehnquist
primarily on the ground that the Court's interpretation of the
Act unconstitutionally interfered with a local jurisdiction's
autonomy, because the record was clear that Rome had not
engaged in intentional discrimination. Rehnquist stated that
Congress did not have the power "to prohibit Rome from
structuring its government in the manner as its population sees
fit absent a finding or unrebutted presumption that Rome has
been, or is, intentionally discriminating against its black
citizens. Rome has simply committed no constitutional
violations, as this Court has defined them." 7 ' The absence of

intentional discrimination for a seventeen-year period also
dictated that Congress lacked the power to interfere with the
political autonomy of the local jurisdiction.
Perhaps no justice articulated the worry about local control
as eloquently as Justice Powell, who also objected to the Court's

application of Sections 4 and 5. Justice Powell called the Act's regional application
"noxious." Georgia, 411 U.S. at 545 n.
6 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
68 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 167 (1980).
6 See id. at 187.
70 See id. at 183.
71 Id. at 218 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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decision in City of Rome. Justice Powell argued that Section 5
encroaches on state sovereignty, which he found "especially
troubling because it destroys local control of the means of selfgovernment, one of the central values of our polity." 72 From his
perspective:
Unless the federal structure provides some protection for
a community's ordering of its own democratic procedures,
the right of each community to determine its own course
within the boundaries marked by the Constitution is at
risk. Preclearance also operates at an individual level to
diminish the voting rights of residents of covered areas.
Federal review of local voting practices reduces the
influence that citizens have over policies directly
affecting them, and strips locally elected officials of their
autonomy to chart policy. 73

Chief Justice Roberts's reference to federalism costs in
Northwest Austin and Shelby County is meant to explicitly
incorporate by reference all of these prior expressions of concern
and subsume them under the federalism costs umbrella. 74
Interestingly, it did not matter to the Court's decision in Shelby
County that most of these concerns were never expressed by a
majority of the Court, but only by individual justices in
dissenting or concurring opinions. Moreover, as we note in Part
I.A, even when the Court has articulated its concerns with the
federalism costs of the VRA, as it did in Northwest Austin and
Shelby County, it has done so in vague terms.
C.

Assessing the "Federalism Costs" Concern

When the Court first expressed a concern with the
federalism costs of the VRA in Miller v. Johnson, it was at a
time that the Court's federalism revolution was in full swing,
with cases such as United States v. Lopez, 5 Seminole Tribe v.
7 6 and City
Florida,
of Boerne v. Flores7 7 casting grave

City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 201 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 201-02 (Powell, J., dissenting).
74
See N. W Austin, 557 U.S. at 202 ("These federalism costs have caused Members
of this Court to express serious misgivings about the constitutionality of § 5.").
7
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
72
7

76

517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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constitutional doubts on the exercise of Congressional power
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. To be sure,
the Court was unprepared to subject the VRA to meaningful
constitutional scrutiny, at least not yet. Indeed, in City of
Boerne, one of the Court's new federalism cases, Justice
Kennedy pointed to the VRA as a model exercise of
Congressional power. 8 This led at least one prominent scholar
to reason that the Court's new federalism jurisprudence did not
threaten the constitutionality of Section 5.79 But Miller reflected
the then-ascendant federalism jurisprudence.
If City of Boerne was reflective of the Court's approach,
Northwest Austin and Shelby County represent a course
correction. Chief Justice Roberts's argument in Northwest
Austin and Shelby County is two-fold. First, he argues that the
Section 4-Section 5 coverage-preclearance tandem has always
been costly. In Shelby County,80 he points us back to Northwest
Austin and in Northwest Austin, he points us back to Miller v.
Johnson.81 Miller takes us all the way back to Justice Black's
dissent in Katzenbach.82 The point is that the VRA has imposed
federalism costs since its inception and the Court has been
cognizant of that fact. Second, he argues, though those costs
have been warranted because of the pervasiveness of racial
discrimination in voting, they are no longer warranted because
"[t]hings have changed." 83 Racial discrimination in voting by
southern state actors is no longer the national problem that it
once was. Consequently, the constitutional costs of the VRA now
outweigh its purported benefits.
The problem with the majority's analysis in Northwest
Austin and in Shelby County is that nowhere do we get an actual
account of the tangible costs imposed by the VRA. Does the VRA
in fact limit local autonomy? Does it prevent localities from
implementing beneficial laws? How do we in fact balance those
costs against the purported benefits of the VRA? Is the

" 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
See id. at 519 (1997).

78

7
See Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and
Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007).
8
133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621 (2013).
8' 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009).
82
515 U.S. 900, 926-27 (1995).
83 N. W. Austin, 557 U.S. at 202.
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preclearance regime simply preventing wholesome electoral
rules from going into effect instead of precluding discriminatory
practices? Is the sixty-day moratorium that the VRA imposes on
covered jurisdictions before they can implement their voting
changes costly? The Court does not answer these types of
questions nor does it appear interested in the requisite analysis.
The Court's conclusion appears to be an ipse dixit; it is an article
of faith. The VRA limits local jurisdictional autonomy, even if it
does so slightly; therefore, the VRA imposes federalism costs
and is presumptively unconstitutional.
Upon inspection, the federalism
costs objection is
84
overblown. As a point of departure, Section 5's most critical
feature is that it addresses the problem of information
asymmetry. Section 5's "preclearance requirement forces the
institutions with the best information about potentially
discriminatory practices to share that information with third
parties. Preclearance thus facilitates monitoring through
disclosure."8 5 Preclearance is "a regime of forced disclosure or
'information-pushing."'8 6
A regime of "information-pushing" or compelled disclosure
does not seem sufficiently problematic to raise such significant
constitutional questions. In other contexts, such as campaign
finance, the Court has accepted as "sufficiently important" the
interest in compelling
government's information-eliciting
political candidates, parties, and even individuals to disclose
political contributions and expenditures even in the face of
countervailing First Amendment concerns.87 The Court went as
far as to state in Citizens United v. FEC, the case that struck
down a federal statute prohibiting corporate expenditures, that
alternative
to more
a less
restrictive
"disclosure is
8
of speech."
Perhaps forced
regulations
comprehensive
disclosure is a federalism cost and the federal government

84 See Halberstam, supra note 53.
5 Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Mapping a Post-Shelby County
Contingency Strategy, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 131, 137 (2013).
Halberstam, supra note 53, at 955.
8
8
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 421 U.S. 1, 66 (1976) (noting that "disclosure provides
the electorate with information 'as to where political money comes from and how it is
spent by the candidate"'); see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003); see also
Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010). See generally Elizabeth Garrett, McConnell v. FEC and
Disclosure, 3 ELECTION L.J. 237 (2004).
8 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 369 (2010).
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cannot compel the states to provide information about how their
electoral changes impact racial minorities. If this were the case,
it would have been helpful for the Court to address the point
directly than to wave generally about federalism costs.
It is true that preclearance is not simply or only
information-eliciting. It does preclude covered jurisdictions from
changing their election laws unless federal authorities,
specifically the Department of Justice or the Federal District
Court for the District of Columbia, approve those laws. This is
the argument for loss of control, and the point on which Justice
Black focused his dissent in Katzenbach. The argument does not
stand up to scrutiny. To begin, almost all of the laws submitted
for preclearance are precleared, on the order of 99 percent. 89
Preclearance, as a practical matter, does not prevent covered
laws.
implementing their electoral
from
jurisdictions
Undoubtedly, as a prophylaxis, preclearance might preclude
some jurisdictions from passing certain laws that those
jurisdictions fear will not be precleared. But if most of those
would-be laws would have been discriminatory, then the
preclearance mechanism is performing its deterrent effect as
designed. Because the preclearance rate is so high, there is no
reason to believe that covered jurisdictions would hesitate to
promulgate non-discriminatory laws because of the preclearance
mechanism. If they promulgate a law, it will be precleared,
except in the very small percentage of cases. Thus, at most,
preclearance forces a dialectic exchange between national
officials and local officials as local officials confer with national
officials to ensure that local laws are not discriminatory.9 0
Practically, in almost all cases, the practice of preclearance boils

8 See Drew Spencer & Rob Richie, The Role of Fair Voting Systems in the Shelby
County Case, available at http: //www.fairvote.org /research-and-analysis/blog/the-role-ofarchived at http: //perma.cc /7DDWfair-voting-systems-in-the-shelby-county-casel,
BXNR ("Preclearance is effective for stopping the most discriminatory laws from even
going forward, as over 99% of DOJ reviews result in preclearance.").
" See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2639 n. 4 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("Congress also received evidence that many covered jurisdictions engaged in
an 'informal consultation process' with DOJ before formally submitting a proposal, so
that the deterrent effect of preclearance was far broader than the formal submissions
alone suggest."). For an argument that the Roberts Court no longer considers this
deterrence function as a justification for the constitutionality of the preclearance regime,
see Ellen D. Katz, DismissingDeterrence, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 248 (2014).

130

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[ 2015

down to a temporary delay of less than sixty days before the
covered jurisdiction can implement its law. 91
Moreover, preclearance does not take away from the states
and local officials the authority to design their election systems.
Professor Halberstam has observed:
State and local officials decide on voter registration
qualifications, practices and procedures, what type of
voting systems to adopt, how to district, where to locate
polling places, and where to expand cities by annexing
neighboring populations. So long as the new law,
practice,
or
procedure
does
not violate
the
antidiscrimination standard, there is no substantive
federal input. Decisions on election design remain in local
hands. 92
In fact, rather than take away local control, preclearance
enhances localism. This is because preclearance forces state and
sub-state officials to consult with local minorities to assure that
their needs are taken into account in the promulgation of
electoral rules and in the design of electoral institutions. From
this perspective, preclearance is localizing, if local minorities
count. The only national policy effectuated by preclearance is
that of non-discrimination, which is a constitutional command.
Of course one could argue that national policy, even if
backed by a constitutional command, nevertheless infringes
upon state sovereignty. An obvious answer is that the
Constitution trumps state sovereignty where state sovereignty
is inconsistent with constitutional values. But this reply is too
facile and does not respond to Shelby County's federalism
impulse. A more complicated analysis recognizes, as the Court in
Shelby County recognized, that both federalism and nondiscrimination are constitutional commands. If one is committed
to that view-that federalism and non-discrimination are both
constitutional commands-the next step is determining which
command trumps when giving effect to both are not possible. For
a long time, at least in the domain of voting, there was a clear
answer: racial equality trumps federalism every time. But
Shelby County muddies the waters a bit and introduces two

9
92

See Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 439, codified at 42 U.S.C.
Halberstam, supra note 53, at 948.

§ 1973c(a).
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possibilities. One possibility is that federalism trumps racial
equality. This would be a radical and aggressive departure from
current doctrine. It would also be an aggressive interpretation of
Shelby County. Interpreting Shelby County in this way would
erase the constitutional, statutory, and jurisprudential
achievements of Reconstruction and the Civil Rights Movement,
upon which all of our conceptions of racial equality rests. No
serious person, no matter how committed they are to federalism,
would argue today that state sovereignty trumps racial equality
where the two are incapable of inhabiting the same
constitutional space.
But there is a much less radical reading of the role that
federalism plays in Shelby County. If the majority's goal in
Shelby County is to give effect to two constitutional values that
can sometimes cause earthquakes, like tectonic plates rubbing
against each other, one strategy for reducing the friction is to
reduce the span of one of the plates. That is, we can limit the
clash between federalism and racial equality by interpreting the
scope of one or the other narrowly. Arguably, this was the option
that the Court chose in the early cases interpreting the VRA, in
particular South Carolina v. Katzenbach, in which nationalism
trumped federalism. 93 This is also, arguably, the strategy that
best explains Shelby County, with a crucial difference of course.
Whereas Katzeabach interpreted federalism narrowly and thus
minimized a clash between federalism and racial equality,
Shelby County interprets racial equality narrowly to avoid a
clash between federalism and racial equality. From this
perspective, the "federalism costs" imposed by the VRA are costs
to the federalism project itself. At stake is the conception of
states as sovereign or even autonomous entities entitled to selfrule with minimal interference from the center. A broad
conception of racial equality, which would justify Congressional
intervention in the voting machinery of the states through the
VRA, would undermine that project.
Fundamentally, then, Shelby County does not present new
arguments. What we see instead is a recalibration of the age-old
tension between federalism and non-discrimination. At the level
of doctrine, one could argue that Shelby County is the
culmination of an echo chamber, as the conservative justices

9

383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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cross-cite old opinions in an effort to legitimize the "federalism
costs" narrative. Northwest Austin and Shelby County seek to
communicate the impression, whether accurate or not, that the
worry about federalism costs is a longstanding concern of not
just a few justices, but of the Court itself. The difference
between Shelby County and Katzenbach is that the nationalists
are in the minority and the anti-nationalists now control the
Court. Dissenting and concurring positions are now majority
opinions. Judicial ideology explains the consideration for
federalism and the costs to federalism, as part and parcel of a
larger solicitude towards the rights of states and against a
strong assertion of national power.
As we argued in this Part, however, it is difficult to
determine concretely what these federalism costs are. The
harder one looks, the more these federalism costs seem more
hypothetical than actual. The inability to identify the
substantive content of these federalism costs with any precision
explains why the Court in both Northwest Austin and Shelby
County opted to frame its fears about federalism costs in
expressive terms, 94 without any evident struggle to identify
more concretely the substance of those costs. For the Court in
Northwest Austin and Shelby County, in other words, it comes
down to the loss of dignity by the states and the concomitant
ignominy caused by the reduction of the states' sovereignty. 95
The term "federalism costs" has become the boogeyman of
race conscious legislation, at least in the context of voting rights.
The idea of "federalism costs" is shorthand for the accepted view
that the Voting Rights Act is "strong medicine" and of necessity
treads on issues reserved to the states by the Constitution as
drafted in 1787. The phrase is the language in which the Court
signals its displeasure with how the Act has undermined the
sovereignty of the states, not always or particularly in material
terms, but also in expressive terms. At the end of the day,
Justice Black has won.

9 See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 13, at 516 (noting that the federalism
worry is about the "message that the VRA sends about the proper and respective roles of
the federal government and the states").
9 As Professor Tolson has argued, the Court seems to confuse sovereignty with
autonomy. See Tolson, supra note 12, at 1199-201, 1207.
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HOW DID RECONSTRUCTION AFFECT OUR FEDERALISM?

The majority's decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach
was based, at least in part, on the proposition that
notwithstanding the federalism costs imposed by the VRA, the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments authorized those costs.
Put differently, one could easily concede the proposition that the
Act is far more aggressive than most legislation, that the costs it
exacts from the states are "extraordinary," 96 even unique, that
the constitutional concerns are "substantial,"9 7 but nevertheless
conclude that the Act passes rational basis review because the
Reconstruction Amendments authorize Congress to limit state
autonomy in the manner effected by the Act.
This is one way of understanding the Court's decision in
Katzenbach. Read this way, Katzenbach stands for the
proposition that a central purpose of the Reconstruction
Amendments was to authorize Congress to rein in the states and
limit federalism when necessary to guard against racial
inequality. The key inquiry in Katzenbach, and the inquiry that
should have motivated the Court in Shelby County, is not
whether the Act exacts costs on state sovereignty. Rather, the
question is whether the Reconstruction Amendments authorized
Congress to impose these costs. Relatedly, one can also
understand Katzenbach as standing for the proposition that
Congress is the proper institution for deciding whether the costs
imposed by the Act are justified.9 8 So long as Congress's decision
is "reasonable" under the Constitution, the Court is compelled to
defer to Congress's determination. The fundamental inquiry
then is, did the Reconstruction Amendments change anything?
Interestingly and surprisingly, as we discuss in this Part, this is
an issue that the majority in Shelby County did not address.
We begin with first principles. Our federalism evokes
images of "Fourth of July parades down Main Street, drugstore
soda fountains, and family farms with tire swings in the front
yard."9 9 This is not to say, as the Supreme Court wrote in
96 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Williams,
J.,
dissenting).
9
Id. at 885 (quoting N. W. Austin, 557 U.S. at 202).
9 Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 13, at 504-08; Luis Fuentes-Rohwer,
Legislative Findings, CongressionalPowers, and the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 82
IND. L.J. 99 (2007).
9 Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
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Younger v. Harris,100 that courts must blindly defer to the states,
nor does it place control of all important policy questions in the
national government. 101 Rather, the Court explained that
federalism is "a system in which there is sensitivity to the
legitimate interests of both State and National Governments,
and in which the National Government, anxious though it may
be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests,
always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere
with the legitimate activities of the States." 102 This sensitivity
demands accommodation of interests. Power is centered in
neither sphere but is balanced appropriately.
One question raised by Shelby County is whether the Court
has properly allocated the power between the federal
government and the states. Shelby County is yet another case in
a notable line of cases showing that the states are winning the
federalism battle. If we think of our federalism as a
pendulum, 103 it is clear that the weight is pivoting decidedly
towards the states. For the most part, the anti-nationalists
justify this swing by citing to the virtues of federalism, which
include
increased
political
participation,
governmental
responsiveness, and checks on governmental power.104 Above all,
federalism "ensure[s] protection of our fundamental liberties."1 0 5
It is fair to ask whether these ostensible virtues are supported
empirically,1 06 a question to which we will return below. For the

Neurosis, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 903, 906 (1994).
100 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
101
102
103

See id. at 44.
Id.
See THE ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE, THE COURTS:
THE

&

PENDULUM OF FEDERALISM (Joanna Dailey, ed. 1979); Ronald J. Bacigal, The Federalism
Pendulum, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 771, 771 (1996); Keith Werhan, Checking Congress and
Balancing Federalism:A Lesson from Separation-of-PowersJurisprudence, 57 WASH.
LEE L. REV. 1213, 1242-57 (2000).
10 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-60 (1991); Ann Althouse,
Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism:A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 DUKE
L.J. 979 (1993); Deborah J. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988).
105 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (citation omitted). See Printz
v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) ("This separation of the two spheres is one of the
Constitution's structural protections of liberty."); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (explaining
that "a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front").
106
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Does Federalism Advance Liberty?, 47 WAYNE L. REV.
911, 913 (2001) ("One thing, however is clear: federalism has not been about increasing
liberty."); Rubin and Feely, supra note 99, at 907 ("In our view, federalism in America
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moment, we consider a prior question: whether the
Reconstruction Amendments ought to matter to the antinationalist justices as they reallocate the federalism balance.
That is, did the Reconstruction Amendments alter the
federalism calculus at all and should anti-nationalist judges
care? Irrespective of what historians of Reconstruction tell us
about this question, how do the justices themselves understand
the question, and how do they address it?
Return once more to the Court's Shelby County opinion.
This case is tailor-made for a discussion of congressional powers
and how Reconstruction might have affected original
understandings. This is a case, after all, not simply about the
authority to structure state and local governments, but about
claims of racial discrimination in voting. If Section 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment speaks to any issue at all, it certainly
speaks to this one. And yet, here's what we get from the Court:
Outside the strictures of the Supremacy Clause, States
retain broad autonomy in structuring their governments
Indeed, the
and pursuing legislative objectives.
specifically
not
powers
that
all
provides
Constitution
granted to the Federal Government are reserved to the
States or citizens.10 7
For support, Chief Justice Roberts cites the Tenth
Amendment.10 8 Full stop. But the obvious question is, at the
very least, whether the Reconstruction Amendments "may be
treated as a gloss" 09 on the Tenth Amendment? The Court's
decision in Shelby County, as evidenced by its reliance on the
Tenth Amendment in support of its reserved powers argument,
rests on the assumption that the Reconstruction Amendments
did not change our understanding of "our federalism" in any
meaningful way. The Court's assumption in Shelby County begs
the question about the purposes of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. One might think that the reserved powers of the
states were altered by the grant of power to Congress in Section

achieves none of the beneficial goals that the Court claims for it."). But see Lynn A.
Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of JudicialReview, 51
DUKE L.J. 75, 136-39 (2001).
107
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013).
10'

See id. at 2623.

'" See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 611 (1952).

136

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[ 2015

5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Fifteenth.
Put differently, the Court should produce an argument, at the
very least, that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments did
not alter the voting landscape, rather than simply trot out the
Tenth Amendment as a trump card.
Instead, Chief Justice Roberts deploys two arguments we
have seen many times before: first, that federalism is an
unqualified good, as a preserver of liberty; and second, that this
is the federalism balance as forged at the founding. More
specifically, while conceding that Congress has "significant
control over federal elections," the Court underscores that the
states have "broad powers to determine the conditions under
which the right of suffrage may be exercised."1 10 Notably,
Reconstruction plays no role in the quest to identify and restore
the original federalism line.
One response to the restoration project is to view it as
incoherent. As Professor Tolson has argued, the quest to find
and restore the supposed original federalism balance is
"elusive,"111 "arbitrary,"1 1 2 and "nonexistent." 1 3 A second
response is to take issue with the Court's historiography and the
way it has played a crucial role in obscuring the significance of
the Reconstruction Amendments. 114 At the very least, the Court
has emphasized certain parts of our federalism history over
others. If this is true, the recent federalism revival, and the way
the Court portrays the history of our federalism from the
founding and through the Civil War, is in line with the Court's
past practice of downplaying or ignoring the importance of
Reconstruction to federalism. Shelby County is consistent with
that past practice.
To be sure, the Court has discussed federalism principles at
great length prior to Shelby County.115 One can certainly dispute
no0 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623 (citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91
(1965))
(quotations omitted).
1n Tolson, supra note 12, at 1200.
112
Id.
113 Id. at 1253.
'14 See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH (1999); Norman W. Spaulding,

Constitution As Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and the Problem of
Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 (2003). For the classic account of historical
memory and how we remember the Civil War and Reconstruction era, see DAVID W.
BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY (2003).

us See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521
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the quality of this history. 116 But far more important is the way
in which the Court has considered the larger historical narrative
of federalism. The justices themselves have played a critical role
in creating and legitimizing a particular and partial version of
constitutional history, particularly Reconstruction. Professor
Norman Spaulding discusses this point, framed as a problem of
collective memory, quite arrestingly. 117 According to Spaulding,
"[t]he historical consciousness of the federalism revival, the logic
of its memory work, turns on a chillingly amnesic reproduction
of antebellum conceptions of state sovereignty." 18 In other
words, we remember our federalism as forged at the founding
while discounting-or rather forgetting, or refusing to
remember-the Civil War and Reconstruction, that very
moment in history when the country almost cracked at the
fissures of its federalism failure. Chief Justice Roberts's citation
to the Tenth Amendment is an attempt to lay "claim to the
ostensibly unimpeachable authority of returning to first
principles and founding intentions."1 19 The return to first
principles is as much an attempt to cleanse founding-era
federalism as it is to re-remember, or remember differently, the
Civil War and Reconstruction. "Our descent into a protracted,
internecine war following secession was over nothing, after all, if
not the fate of a particularly robust strain of federalism and the
grave, anti-democratic injustices it insulated." 120 Even as the
logic of federalism pulled the country apart along sectional lines,
federalism's constitutional standing lost none of its luster.
U.S. 507 (1997); Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452 (1991).
us See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 762-808, 814 (1999)
(Souter, J.,
dissenting) (describing Court's view of state sovereign immunity as "true neither to
history nor to the structure of the Constitution"); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
95-99 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In reference to the Court's discussion of the
historical record in City of Boerne, for example, see Ruth Colker, The Supreme Court's
Historical Errors in City of Boerne v. Flores, 43 B.C. L. REV. 783 (2002); Michael W.
McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation:A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111
HARV. L. REV. 153, 174-83 (1997). Compare also the Court's suggestion that Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment was redrafted in order to assuage federalism concerns, City
of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520-24, with Eric Foner's argument that this section was
redrafted in order to allow the judiciary to protect rights at times when Congress did not,
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 228-80
(1988).
117

Spaulding, supra note 114.
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Id. at 2015.

119 Id.
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This move allows us to understand the concept of federalism
as conditioning the Reconstruction project. Reconstruction could
not radically alter the foundational commitment to federalism; it
changed nothing. Reconstruction needed to take a backseat to
first principles. In time, it might even disappear from view.
This narrative of Reconstruction began as soon as the
Supreme Court considered the landmark achievement of the
period in the Slaughterhouse Cases.121 Remember the question:
how did Reconstruction alter the original federalism calculus?
The Court offers its answer in the following passage:
Was it the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, by the
simple declaration that "no State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States," to transfer the security
and protection of all the civil rights which we have
mentioned, from the States to the Federal government?
And where it is declared that Congress shall have the
power to enforce that article, was it intended to bring
within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil
rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States? 122
To ask this question, of course, is to answer it. Such was the
memory of federalism as established by the founding generation
and understood by the Court in 1873.
The Roberts Court is clearly channeling this argument, and
this memory of Reconstruction, in Shelby County. But this
memory emphasizes only part of our federalism history. In
reference to the Equal Protection Clause, the Slaughterhouse
Cases underscored that Reconstruction had assigned a
particular role for the Court. According to Justice Miller:
In the light of the history of these amendments, and the
pervading purpose of them, which we have already
discussed, it is not difficult to give a meaning to [the
Equal Protection] clause. The existence of laws in the
States where the newly emancipated negroes resided,
which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship

121

122

The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
Id. at 77.
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against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by
this clause, and by it such laws are forbidden. 123
This language is indicative of a Court willing to protect the
rights of the freedmen even if unwilling to become a censor of
state laws when it came to the general question of rights
enforcement. The argument should apply with considerable force
to cases like Shelby County, when a claim of racial
discrimination is supported by the explicit protections
constitutionalized by the Fifteenth Amendment.
In due course, however, the Supreme Court, and the nation
in general, lost its appetite to take on the racist elements of its
society. Scholars disagree whether Slaughterhouse signals this
shift, or United States v. Cruikshank,124 or the Civil Rights
Cases,125 or even Plessy v. Ferguson.126 We do not need to resolve
this scholarly argument here. 127 For our purposes, it is
important to note only that a scholarly debate exists, 2 8 and that
the Supreme Court is not willing to acknowledge it.
123

Id. at 81.

124

92 U.S. 542 (1875).

125

109 U.S. 3 (1883).

126

163 U.S. 537 (1896); see PAMELA
SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION (2011).

BRANDWEIN,

RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL

127
A subsequent project will tackle these questions head on. For now, we simply
note that, whatever one thinks of when the judicial retreat from Reconstruction began,
the Chase and Waite Courts undermined important anti-terrorist laws that protected
democracy and majority rule and allowed for the forging of multi-racial coalitions. See,
e.g., ERIC FONER, supra note 116, at 279, 342-44, 425-44 (1988); VERNON LANE

WHARTON, THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI 1865-1890 181-206 (1984); Michael Kent Curtis,

The Klan, The Congress, and The Court: Congressional Enforcement of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments and the State Action Syllogism: A Brief Historical Overview,
11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1381 (2009). These early decisions-e.g., The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875);
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629
(1882)-according to Michael Kent Curtis, "helped a minority that used terrorist tactics,
force, and fraud displace democracy and majority rule." Id. at 1383. The results, he
writes, "were especially awful for Americans of African descent." Id.
128 See, e.g., BRANDWEIN, supra note 114; FONER, supra note 116, at 529-31 (1988);
ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 (1985); MICHAEL LES

BENEDICT,

Preserving the

Constitution:

The

Conservative Basis

of

Radical

Reconstruction, in PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA 3-22 (2006); Michael Les Benedict,

Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 39
(1978); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil
War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 891 (1986) (arguing that the critical
question for federalism after the war "was which government, the national or the state,
possessed the primary power and responsibility for securing citizens' fundamental
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The Court's apparent refusal to take cognizance of the
historical debate surrounding Reconstruction is worth noting for
a more important reason. The ebbs and flows of Reconstruction
history, and the role this history plays on judicial decisionmaking, offers an important example of why the content of our
constitutional history must be understood as "a matter of
normative value." 12 9 In the words of Richard Primus:

We want the history to be one thing rather than another,
to illustrate -certain principles or ideals that make it
worth being connected to. The normative stakes in
choosing which history to deploy in constitutional
discourse thus transcend proximate issues about how
particular bits of history will bear on cases, because the
struggle over the content of constitutional history is only
partly a struggle about how those cases will be decided. It
is also a struggle about a more general sense of the
meaning of American constitutional history. 130
This is an argument for constitutional history as a judicial
creation, bound by the biases, ideology, and particular outcomes
that the justices inevitably hold. To be sure, there are times
when the justices simply make mistakes. This is how we choose
to think of the way the federal courts often cited to works from
the Dunning School, and particularly Claude Bowers' The Tragic
Era,131 which Eric Foner offers an as example of "the persistent
white supremacist narrative of Reconstruction masquerading as
proper history." 132 But more generally, the justices use history
instrumentally, as a way to justify decisions reached on other

rights" and concluding that the power must lie with the national government); Robert C.
Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal AntidiscriminationLegislation
After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 507 n. 290 (2000) ("Legal historians are
divided in their assessment of this tumultuous period of constitutional development and
the Court's performance in it."). For a brief overview of this literature, see Michael Les
Benedict, Constitutional History and Constitutional Theory: Reflections on Ackerman,
Reconstruction, and the Transformation of the American Constitution, 108 YALE L.J.
2011, 2028-35 (1999).
129 Richard A. Primus, JudicialPower and Mobilizable History, 65 MD.
L. REV. 171,
194 (2006).
130

Id.

131

CLAUDE G. BOWERS, THE TRAGIC ERA: THE REVOLUTION AFTER LINCOLN (1929).

Eric Foner, The Supreme Court and the History of Reconstruction-and ViceVersa, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1594 (2012) (quoting BRUCE E. BAKER, WHAT
132

RECONSTRUCTION MEANT: HISTORICAL MEMORY IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 148 (2007)).
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grounds. 133 This is one way of thinking about the affirmative
action cases, the school desegregation cases, and the vote
dilution cases, which offer what Foner calls "a cramped and
ahistorical understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the era of Reconstruction."1 3 4
The reality is that people of color have fared worse at the
state level than at the national level. It bears asking why the
federal government has provided a far friendlier forum for
communities of color to protect themselves and their interests.
Whatever the answer, it would not be implausible to view
Reconstruction as a moment when we reset the federalism
calculus, and placed the federal government ahead of the states.
This is an argument that one particular reading of
Slaughterhouse appeared to dismiss. But then, hasn't history
overruled Slaughterhouse?
Another way to think about this issue is by thinking about
race legislation as historical anomalies, which altered the
federalist balance but only, and perhaps intentionally, for a time
and for particular historical reasons. Think here of the
Freedmen's Bureau, which was established on a temporary
basis, 135 or the Voting Rights Act, whose special provisions were
set to expire within five years of enactment, 136 or even Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger, which
set a twenty-five year timeline on the use of race in
admissions. 137 Think also, more generally, of the Civil Rights
Cases, when the Court infamously explained:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable
concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in
the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a
mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the
laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be

133
134

Id. at 1604.
Id. at 1600.

135
See An Act to Establish a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and Refugees § 1, 13
Stat 507, 507 (Mar 3, 1865).
13r Voting Rights Act of 1965, P.L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
137 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003).
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protected in the ordinary modes by which other men's
rights are protected.138
The use of race by state actors is to treat people of color not
as "mere citizen[s]" but as the "special favorite[s] of the laws." 13 9
There is much irony in this argument. Prior to the Civil War,
nobody would argue that people of color in the United States
were the special favorites of the laws; in fact, they were quite
the opposite. The War was fought over precisely that principle,
as the country sought to reset constitutional understandings
about racial equality and the right of citizens to own human
beings. The Civil Rights Cases simply beg the question: what
exactly did Reconstruction do? How did it affect the original
federalism calculus? And specifically in reference to the rights of
the very citizens for which the War was fought, how did
Reconstruction alter the balance of power between the states
and the national government to protect the rights of citizens
of color?
But more pertinently, it is worth asking why our
commitment to a certain type of racial equality-what some
might call true racial equality-often seems to manifest itself as
a temporally-bound project. The impatience with the long slog
towards racial equality or, to be more precise, the lack of
toleration for how the quest for racial equality impairs other
types of constitutional values, is a recurring theme in our
constitutional history. These are the Civil Rights Cases, the
Freedmen's Bureau, the VRA, Grutter, and Shelby County. In
other words, even if we assume that Reconstruction and the
Civil Rights Movement relocated the federalism line in favor of
the federal government as against the states, and if the federal
government gained more power at the expense of the states
because doing so was necessary to achieve racial equality,
whatever power the federal government gained was only
temporary. That is, one cannot assume any fixity with
federalism and one cannot assume linearity with racial equality.
Indeed, at least with respect to racial equality, its status seems
to be historically contingent. 140 This is the lesson of the Civil
Rights Cases, Grutter, and Shelby County.
138

109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).

1

S Id.

140

See Louis Michael Seidman, Depoliticizing Federalism, 35 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
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It may very well be the case that we as a nation have never
been full-throated nationalists and it is certainly the case that
we as a nation have never subscribed to racial equality uber
alles as a constitutional principle. Nevertheless, even granting
these points, it does not follow that Reconstruction and the
Reconstruction Amendments contributed nothing to federalism.
The modern Supreme Court has yet to wrestle with the history
of Reconstruction or to offer its account of the relationship
among race, the Reconstruction Amendments, and federalism.
Maybe the Reconstruction Amendments do not add much to the
federalism debate. Maybe the federalism balance forged at the
Founding was the proper balance, though such a conclusion
would take a very narrow view of what Reconstruction sought to
accomplish. Regardless of the answer to the inquiry about the
relationship between federalism and Reconstruction, these
questions were front and center in Shelby County and they
deserved to be addressed. Given how race has affected our
understanding of federalism from the Founding, through
Reconstruction, and through the Civil Rights era, the Court's
analysis in Shelby County is, at the very least, incomplete.
Moreover, given how critical federalism is to the Court's decision
in Shelby County, the failure to wrestle with these admittedly
difficult questions weakens the Court's analysis and makes the
federalism project less compelling.
III. RACE AND FEDERALISM UP AND DOWN
Return now to the empirical question about the utility of
federalism that we left open in the last Part. In this Part we
want to introduce a consideration that has not been central to
the modern federalism debate: whether federalism enhances the
liberty of people of color. Chief Justice Roberts's desire in Shelby
POL'Y 121, 122 (2012) ("The argument about federalism is, or at least should be, deeply
contextual, and it is political to the core. In different times and places, federalism has
differing relationships with substantive justice, and, in all times and all places, people
disagree about what counts as substantive justice."); see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr.,
Evolving Understandingsof American Federalism:Some Shifting Parameters, 50 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 635, 697 (2005-06):
This essay has suggested some of the ways in which America federalism and
our basic assumptions about its nature have changed over the centuries. When
we study the federal system, it suggests, we are examining an evolving
phenomenon, and we are doing so on the basis of concepts, assumptions and
criteria that are themselves changing.
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County to return the federalism balance to what it was not only
prior to the intervention of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, but also
prior to the Nineteenth Century and the Civil War
Amendments, could be sensible under the right set of
assumptions. One of the supposed great virtues of (our)
federalism is that it enhances liberty because it facilitates the
ability of national or ethnocultural minorities to rule by
becoming local majorities. 1 4 1 From this perspective, defending
federalism is defending the liberty of local minorities against
national majorities. But the question that anti-nationalists, in
particular the anti-nationalists on the Court, often fail to ask is,
liberty for whom? The critical inquiry for modern proponents of
federalism is whether federalism works for racial minorities in
the way that federalist theorists purport. Put differently, states'
rights theorists 1 42 never pause to ask whether the states are
truly in competition with the federal government for protecting
the rights of racial minorities. They never pause to ask whether
federalism is good for people of color.
Though past need not be prologue, the concept of states'
rights has, to put the point mildly, a sordid past in American
history. 1 4 3 Federalism has not generally been viewed as an
institutional arrangement that enhances the liberty of racial
minorities in the United States; in fact, it has been viewed as
doing the opposite. 144 The way that racism has been deployed in
the name of federalism is a problem for federalism's
advocates. 14 5 Whether fair or not, states' rights in the United
'
142

See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
We use the term descriptively and not at all pejoratively.

143 See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, States' Rights, Southern Hypocrisy, and the Crisis of
the Union, 45 AKRON L. REV. 449 (2012); Larry Yackle, Competitive Federalism: Five
Clarifying Questions, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1403 (2014).
144 See Douglas Laycock, ProtectingLiberty in a FederalSystem: The US Experience,

in PATTERNS OF REGIONALISM AND FEDERALISM: LESSONS FOR THE UK 119, 119-47 (J6rg

Fedtke & Basil S. Markesinis, eds. 2006); Mark DeWolfe Howe, Federalism and Civil
Rights, 77 PROC. MASS. HIST. Soc'Y 15, 18 (1965) (arguing that "the old commitment to
national silence and national disability still serves to make American federalism a
significant impediment to the fulfillment of civil rights"); S. G. F. Spackman, American
Federalism and the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 10 J.AM. STUD. 313, 328 (1976) ("The
federal system has always been as stout barrier to racial justice as American attitudes
and political demands.").
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WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE
152, 155

(1964) (explaining that "[t]he main beneficiary [of federalism] throughout American
history has been the Southern Whites, who have been given the freedom to oppress
Negroes . . .. [I]f in the United States one approves of Southern white racists, then one
should approve of American federalism."). Riker softened his earlier views in later
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States has generally been associated with racial inequality. 146
Conversely, federal power has generally been associated with
racial equality.1 47 From the perspective of citizens of color,
liberty has in fact been delivered not by federalism but by
nationalism. 148 It thus would take a lot of chutzpah to curtail
federal power, which is being deployed to protect liberty in an
area where the states have engaged in notorious and rampant
race discrimination, in the name of states' rights. But this is
precisely what Chief Justice Roberts did in Shelby County.
Central to the Chief Justice's argument in Shelby County
the balance between state and federal power is
recalibrating
for
the premise that the states are no longer engaging in systematic
racial discrimination of the type that gave rise to the 1965
Act.1 49 This argument prompted a dissenting response from
Justice Ginsburg, who maintained that the states might go back
to their old ways and use proxies that either directly or
indirectly minimize the political power of racial minorities or
50
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg argued that in
indirectly do so.o

the last fifty years, if not since Reconstruction, the federal
government has assumed the primary responsibility and has in
fact done a better job of protecting the electoral rights of racial
minorities. 15 1 Thus, as between the states and the federal
government, the federal government is the less risky option, the
safer bet.
For both Roberts and Ginsburg, the federalism question
(that is, how much reserved powers do the states have or should
the states have as against the federal government in the voting
domain) is a function of a predictive judgment: whether the
states are likely to engage in racial discrimination in voting as
they did before or whether we have we moved well beyond that
era. If we think the states are likely to backtrack, we ought to

works. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1987).

146

See id. For a rejoinder as applied to modern note 25, at 37-38.

147

Laycock, supra note 144.

148

Id.

Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013) ("Regardless of how to look at
the record, however, no one can fairly say that it shows anything approaching the
'pervasive,' 'flagrant,' 'widespread,' and 'rampant' discrimination that faced Congress in
1965, and that clearly distinguished the covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation
at that time.").
149
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Id. at 2651.
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Id. at 2652.
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favor the federal government; but if we think the states are
reformed, we should return to them the reserved powers they
presumably possessed at the Founding. Both justices used
memorable analogies to make their respective points: Roberts
that robust federal power is no longer necessary and Ginsburg
that the states are likely to backtrack without federal
supervision. 152 During the oral arguments in Northwest Austin,
Roberts characterized the argument that it is the VRA that is
keeping the states from engaging in racial discrimination in
voting to be as compelling as the old story that an "elephant
whistle" explains the absence of elephants. That is, he
continued, "I have this whistle to keep away the elephants. You
know, well, that's silly. Well, there are no elephants, so it must
work." 15 3 In her Shelby County dissent, Ginsburg retorted by
characterizing the argument that the coverage formula is no
longer necessary because states are not currently engaged in
racial discrimination as "like throwing away your umbrella in a
rainstorm because you are not getting wet." 154
Roberts and Ginsburg are undoubtedly engaged in an
important debate. But in one critical respect, the battle between
Roberts and Ginsburg and the sides that they represent is
beside the point, if the point is about federalism. The federalism
question should not be whether the states will or will not engage
in discrimination if federal supervision is removed. The
federalism question ought to be whether the states will compete
with the federal government for the allegiance of racial
minorities. If one important and central argument in favor of
federalism, and thus Shelby County, is that devolution of power
enhances liberty by facilitating self-rule by national minorities
or ethnocultural minorities, the question that Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Ginsburg should have been debating is
whether removing central supervision will now better permit
racial minorities-who are also ethnocultural minorities-to
engage in self-rule. Instead of asking whether the states are
widely or systematically discriminating against their citizens of
color, the Court should have asked how well are the states
152 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, N.W. Austin
Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (No. 08-322) (Elephant); Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2650.
153 Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, N.W. Austin
Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (No. 08-322).
15' Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2650.
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representing the interests of their citizens of color. What is the
congruence between the policy preferences of citizens of color in
Alabama, Texas, North Carolina, Georgia, etc., and the
legislative outcome of their respective states? How well are
these citizens represented by their states? This should be the
question for federalism in this context.
If one is inclined to be generous, one can view Chief Justice
Roberts's opinion in Shelby County as deeply generative. Roberts
wants a restart on race, history, and federalism. Recall here his
point in Shelby County that history did not end in 1965.155 We
have argued elsewhere Roberts used Shelby County to redeem
the states.1 56 But the states are not all that Roberts wants to
redeem; he also wants to redeem federalism from its sordid past,
a laudable goal. The anti-nationalists aim to change the states'
rights narrative so that the idea of states' rights is no longer
synonymous with racial discrimination. Recall also Chief Justice
Roberts's claim in Shelby County that the South has changed, or
at the very least it does not differ much, if at all, from
the North.1 57
The redemption of federalism is an intriguing and
worthwhile project. It would be salutary and productive to get
beyond the states' rights as racism meme. And it is not fair to
federalism's advocates to constantly tar them with the putridity
of the past. But redemption is not cheap. If federalism is to be
redeemed, federalism must work for people of color as well. And
if federalism is to "work" for people of color, it is not enough for
proponents of federalism to show that the states will no longer
engage in rampant racial discrimination.
Our task here is to introduce a distinction between an
argument for states' rights premised on the idea that the states
(or many of them) are no longer engaging in racial
discrimination and an argument for states' rights in which the
states are actively representing the interests of their citizens of
color. From our perspective, the argument for federalism cannot
be premised on the idea that the states are no longer
discriminating against racial minorities. It is not sufficient to
simply say that the states are indifferent. The Court should not
interpret the Constitution in a way that would disempower the
1.s
156

1'7

Id. at 2628.
See Charles and Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 13, at 514-24.
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625.
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federal government, which is the governmental entity that best
represents the interests of citizens of color, and leave citizens of
color to the indifference of the states. Indifference is not an
argument
for federalism.
Federalism
promises better
representation, at least as compared to representation from the
center or as compared to a unitary system. Our point is that the
promise of better representation or the promise of competition
for representation ought to be extended to people of color.158
This is why the argument between Roberts and Ginsburg is
beside the point. The states' side of federalism must do what
federalism theory expects devolution and decentralization to do.
Federalism must defend and protect racial representation. The
states must rival the federal government for the affections of
racial minorities. It is not enough that federalism is not bad for
people of color; federalism must be good for people of color. This
is the task of federalism.
Once the federalism argument is properly framed, we can
see the potential for Shelby County to be deeply generative. If
federalism protects liberty, it is only fair to ask, liberty for
whom? By putting the federalism question on the table, we can
ask seriously and non-cynically whether federalism can do the
work of racial representation and thus further racial equality.159
Shelby County's reintroduction of federalism into the debate
about whether the states or the federal government best
protects people of color imposes a new burden on the states that
they did not until now have to bear. To this point, the states had
to bear the burden of non-discrimination, and had to do so at
least since the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments.
Moving forward, they must now bear the burden of actively and
effectively representing the liberty interests of their citizens of
color. This is the expectation for federalism post-Shelby County.
The redemption project is worth taking seriously. It promises to
be generative and promises to take us beyond tired
recriminations.
Now consider federalism from a different vantage point, not
that of redeeming the states, but that of progressives concerned
's Professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos has recently argued that the policy
preferences of African Americans are underrepresented at both the federal and state
levels. See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness (forthcoming NYU Law
Review); see also Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class
Determinationsand the Poor (forthcoming Cal. L. Rev.).
159 For an argument that it can, see Somin, supranote 25.
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about the redemption of political-racial, gender, sexual, etc.minorities. 16 0 For example, Professor Kathleen Sullivan argued
almost a decade ago that "champions of liberal causes might
need to rethink any reflexive recoil from" the federalism
revolution wrought by the Rehnquist Court because it "might
well contain seeds of a constitutional concept of social fluidity
that can help to realize progressive as well as conservative
ideals." 16 1 Professor Sullivan implicitly reasoned that the
association of progressive equality with nationalism was
historically contingent and always subject to a different political
reality. The valence of federalism changed when the politics
changed. Thus she noted:
But once the Republican Party obtained simultaneous
control of the White House, House, and Senate for the
first time since 1954, local and state initiatives began to
do more than federal programs to advance progressive
social ends. Gay weddings took place through the
executive action of Mayor Gavin Newsom of San
Francisco and the state constitutional interpretation of
Chief Justice Margaret Marshall writing for the
Oregon
Court.
Judicial
Supreme
Massachusetts
pioneered physician-assisted suicide while California
experimented with allowing severely ill patients to use
marijuana medicinally. Suddenly states' rights were no
longer just for segregationist southerners. Conversely,
conservatives have sought to transform entrenched
control of the federal government into nationwide social
restrictions-from regulating late-term abortion to
limiting stem-cell research-that were once unthinkable
at the federal level.162

She concludes that federalism can serve as a handmaiden
for social equality and need not be in service of inequality.
Similarly, Professor Gerken has forcefully argued that:
[I]t is a mistake to equate federalism's past with its
future. State and local governments have become sites of
empowerment for racial minorities and dissenters, the
'6
161

See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 25; Sullivan, supra note 17.
Sullivan, supra note 17, at 801.
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Id. at 810-11.
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groups that progressives believe have the most to fear
from decentralization. In fact, racial minorities and
dissenters can wield more electoral power at the local
level than they do at the national. And while minorities
cannot dictate policy outcomes at the national level, they
can rule at the state and local level. Racial minorities and
dissenters are using that electoral muscle to protect
themselves from marginalization and promote their own
agendas. 1 6 3
Professor Gerken went on to note that "[fjederalism and
localism ...
depend on-even glory in-the idea of minority
rule." 1 64 She reminded us "what we have today is not your
father's federalism."1 6 5

These are strong arguments in favor of reconceptualizing
federalism as capable of redeeming people and not states. We
are certainly open to this possibility. But at least in the context
of voting, the early returns across the states are not very
promising. We can look to North Carolina, or Indiana, or
Wisconsin, or Texas, to name a few states. Following Shelby
County, each of these states moved to change their electoral
laws in ways that were inimical to the electoral liberty interests
of the voters of color in their states. 166 These states are not
engaged in protecting the rights of people of color, far from it. If
we are going to empower the states as the primary guarantors of
racial liberty, we must ensure that they are up to the task. That
task is not about ascertaining whether the states are or are not
engaged in racial discrimination. If we are engaged in that
debate we are not engaged in the task that modernity expects of
federalism. The question for federalism in the 21st century is
whether the states will compete with the federal government to
represent their citizens of color in the same way that they
ostensibly compete to represent their white citizens. The
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challenge for the Court and modern proponents of federalism is
to encourage the states to take up the role that modern
federalism has envisioned for them, or else neo-federalism
should simply be dismissed like the old federalism.
to
further
is
thought
federalism
if
Relatedly,
decentralization-and decentralization is thought to enhance
liberty and self-government-it is not clear why the VRA is not
viewed as an ally of the federalism project. In the context of
voting, the Voting Rights Act is the implementation of
decentralization. Sections 2, 4, and 5 of the VRA compelled
devolution of power, under the right circumstances, to local
entities. The VRA created majority-minority districts, which
assured that voters of color constituted a majority of voters in a
least some electoral jurisdictions. The VRA operated at the
county-level, the school board level, the commission level, and
the city council level, inter alia. It forced political elites at the
state level to consult with sub-state political elites. It
empowered local minorities. Admittedly, the local minorities
empowered by the VRA were racial minorities, but they were
minorities nonetheless. It is hard to conceive of a structural
scheme that empowered local minorities, in this case racial
minorities, more than the VRA.
The puzzling question is, why is the VRA is not viewed as
federalism-reinforcing? Why is it that when we think of states'
rights, we do not think of the large majority of citizens of color
within those states? Even more intriguingly, what will happen
to states' rights when it unequivocally means minority
empowerment? Our aim in this Part was to put those questions
squarely on the table.
CONCLUSION

We are in the midst of an important public conversation
about race, federalism, and voting rights. It is a conversation
about history, doctrine, and politics. The optimistic read on
Shelby County is that it is forcing us to have a conversation
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about the optimal structural and political arrangements for best
representing the citizens of our polity, in particular citizens of
color. Perhaps closer to reality, Shelby County is a legerdemain
that is completely uninterested in representation and is simply
intent on redrawing the federalism line as reset fifty years
before. If so, the federalism enterprise ought to be subjected to
critical inquiry. We must inquire why the project of racial
equality must take a back seat to the federalism project. We
must inquire why the Court is disempowering Congress as the
political body that has best protected the electoral interests of
people of color and empowering the states, the sovereigns that
have historically shown a lesser inclination to extend these
crucial protections. If federalism is to be redeemed, it must first
prove that the states will actively compete with the federal
government to protect the rights of racial minorities. Though
history has not been kind to federalism, we ought to keep an
open mind. However, in the immortal words of Ronald Reagan,
we should trust, but verify.

